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All uNewton: From Certainty to Probability?Kirsten Walsh*y
Newton’s earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only
did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that New-
ton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue
that no such shift occurred. I examine the evidence of a probabilistic shift: a passage
from query 23/31 of the Opticks and rule 4 of the Principia. Neither passage supports
a probabilistic approach to natural philosophy. The aim of certainty, then, was an endur-
ing feature of Newton’s methodology.1. Introduction. Newton’s first optical paper (February 1672) contained a
scandalous epistemological statement: not only did he aim for certain the-
ories; he also claimed success. Some of Newton’s modern commentators
argue that Newton eventually relinquished his claims of certainty, admitting
only a high degree of probability. This view has been perpetuated by Alan
Shapiro (e.g., 1989, 225; 1993, 14) and endorsed more recently by Niccolò
Guicciardini (2011, 20). Shapiro views Newton’s probabilist shift as grad-
ual and somewhat private. He argues that the first shift occurred less than
6 months after writing that first optical paper—on the basis of the criticisms
(Shapiro 1989, 228–29). However, he argues, Newton’s first public statement
of probabilism did not occur until many years later (Shapiro, pers. comm.).
“Only in the last decades of his life,”Shapiro (1993, 14)writes, “did [Newton]
accept the probabilism of his contemporaries” (see also Shapiro 1989, 225).*To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, Room C04 Humanities
Building, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK; e-mail:
walsh.kirsten@gmail.com.
yFor valuable comments on previous versions of this article I would like to thank Adrian
Currie, Niccolò Guicciardini, Craig Fox, and Alan Shapiro. The article also benefited
from helpful discussions at a 2015 workshop titled “Natural History, Mathematics,
and Metaphysics in the Seventeenth Century” and held at the Institute for Research in
the Humanities, University of Bucharest.
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 867Gradual though it may have been, this is a significant shift in Newton’s
thought. Newton’s notion of certainty permeates his views, not only on the
aim of science but also on the nature of evidence, the nature of scientific
reasoning, and how he saw his achievements in mathematics and natural
philosophy (e.g., Walsh 2011). Shapiro has identified two key pieces of tex-
tual evidence for this shift: the first, a response to Hooke in June 1672; and
the second, an explicit statement of probabilism in query 23/31 of theOpticks
(introduced in 1717).1
I argue that Newton remained committed to certainty. First, I examine
the relevant passage from query 23/31 of the Opticks and a related passage,
rule 4, from the Principia. I argue that neither of these passages should be
interpreted as supporting probabilism. Second, I examine the relevant pas-
sage from Newton’s correspondence with Hooke in 1672. I argue that this
passage expresses a similarly qualified notion of certainty as that which New-
ton expressed two years earlier, in his Optical Lectures in 1670. Finally, I
characterize Newton’s notion of certainty as ‘compelled assent’ and conclude
that this was an enduring feature of Newton’s methodology.
2. 1717: Newton’s First Public Statement of Probabilism? That New-
ton claimed some kind of certainty in his early work (in his first optical paper,
for instance) is uncontroversial. Exactly what this ‘certainty’ amounted to is
less clear. I offer an account of this in the final section. For now, let us put this
issue to one side and focus on Newton’s apparent shift to probabilism. In this
section, I will assess Shapiro’s claim that a passage fromquery 23/31 should be
interpreted as probabilism. First, I introduce the relevant passage from query
23/31 and a related passage from the Principia—rule 4—clarifying the stan-
dard (probabilistic) interpretation of these passages. I then offer an alternative
interpretation, based on the application of rule 4 to Newton’s argument for uni-
versal gravitation: rule 4 advises us to adjust the scope of generalizations, not
our credence. Applying this thinking to the original passage, I conclude that
this is not a statement of probabilism and so does not represent a shift in New-
ton’s thinking about certainty.
2.1. The Probabilist Interpretation of Query 23/31 and Rule 4. In 1717,
Newton published the second edition of the Opticks, in which he relabeled
query 23 as query 31 and expanded the methodological discussion.2 Here,
Newton described his methods of analysis and synthesis (or composition).
Newton’s method of analysis involved drawing general propositions from
observations and experiments and, more generally, inferring causes from ef-1. It is interesting to note that Guicciardini (2011, 20, 14) endorses the first shift but not
the second.
2. I follow convention in referring to this as query 23/31.
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All ufects. The method of composition is the inverse: we assume the causes and
infer their effects. The ordering of these methods was important: the method
of composition should always follow the method of analysis, using the causes
discovered by analysis to explain their effects, thus “explaining the Phænom-
ena” and “proving the Explanations” (Newton 1730/1952, 405).3
Expanding on his method of analysis, Newton (1730/1952, 404) wrote
the following statement, which I will refer to as ‘P’:3. In
synth
18–2
4. W
23/31
versa
plicit
believ
5. Th
feren
se subIf no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be pro-
nounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur
from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Excep-
tions as occur.We might be forgiven for interpreting P in hypothetico-deductive terms, as
it seems to suggest that the epistemic status of a theory ought to be sensitive
to new evidence. Indeed, according to Shapiro, this is Newton’s first public
probabilistic statement.
This is a mistake. To understand why, we should see howNewton applied
P in practice. Although P was not invoked explicitly in theOpticks, the same
notion can be found in another late addition to Newton’s work, rule 4 of the
Principia.4
In the third edition of the Principia, Newton (1726/1999, 796) added a
fourth ‘rule for philosophising’:5Rule 4. In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenom-
ena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make
such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions.
This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may
not be nullified by hypotheses.The similarities between this rule and P are striking: that new evidence
can make a proposition “either more exact or liable to exceptions” is similarthis passage, Newton interchangeably referred to the methods of composition and
esis. For discussion, see Guicciardini (2011, 74–78) and Ducheyne (2012, 6–8,
5).
hile the Opticks and the Principia ostensibly deal with different subject matter, query
goes beyond optics to discuss various forces, motions, and systems, including uni-
l gravitation.Moreover, query 23/31 discusses the other rules for philosophizing—ex-
ly drawing methodological connections between the Principia and the Opticks. So I
e I am justified in drawing this comparison.
e rules act as explanatory constraints, or heuristics, enabling Newton to make in-
ces from phenomena and theorems to further theorems.
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 869to pronouncing the conclusion either “generally” or “with such Exceptions as
occur.”
Rule 4 looks like a pragmatic response to the problem of induction:
Newton’s recognition that uncertainty was introduced by ampliative infer-
ence, that is, generalizing from particulars.6 The phrase “very nearly true”
could mean ‘highly probable’. So, it might seem reasonable to put the fol-
lowing hypothetico-deductive gloss on rule 4:6. Fo
7. In
Newt
tion o
All If our best theory fits all the known facts, then we should act as though it is
highly probable (i.e., tentatively accept it) until more facts either support
or refute it.I take it that an interpretation of this kind is the source of Shapiro’s claim.7
However, I argue that this is a misinterpretation of rule 4. Rule 4 was em-
ployed explicitly in the Principia—in the argument for universal gravita-
tion. This use should tell us how to interpret the rule itself and, by exten-
sion, P.
2.2. Rule 4 and Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation. In the
Principia, Newton (1726/1999, 805) explicitly employed rule 4 only once,
in his argument for universal gravitation, proposition 5, book 3:Proposition 5. The circumjovial planets gravitate toward Jupiter, the
circumsaturnian planets gravitate toward Saturn, and the circumsolar plan-
ets gravitate toward the sun, and by the force of their gravity they are always
drawn back from rectilinear motions and kept in curvilinear orbits.The argument takes the following form:
P1. In system S1, effect E is caused by G.
P2. The same effect E also occurs in systems S2, S3, . . ., Sn.
P3. Whenever the same effect occurs, we should infer the same cause.
P4. G is sufficient to cause E in systems S2, S3, . . ., Sn.
P5. If G is sufficient to cause effect E in systems S2, S3, . . ., Sn, then we should infer G and no
other causes of E.
C. In systems S2, S3, . . ., Sn, effect E is caused by G and no other causes (from P1, P2, P3,
P4, and P5).r an account of Newton’s method of ‘inductive gradualism’, see Ducheyne (2005).
deed, Shapiro’s (1993, 200) hypothetico-deductive reading of the development of
on’s theory of fits suggests that he supports the hypothetico-deductive interpreta-
f Newton’s method more generally.
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All uNewton’s argument for universal gravitation proceeds step by step from
the motion of the moon with respect to the earth, the motions of the moons
of Jupiter and Saturn with respect to Jupiter and Saturn, and the motions of
the planets with respect to the sun, to the forces producing those motions.
Thus, in this argument, system S1 refers to the two-body earth-moon sys-
tem. Systems S2, S3, . . . , Sn refer respectively to two-body systems involv-
ing Jupiter and each of its moons, Saturn and each of its moons, and the sun
and each of the planets.
In the scholium following proposition 5, Newton (1726/1999, 806) wrote,
“Hitherto we have called ‘centripetal’ that force by which celestial bodies are
kept in their orbits. It is now established that this force is gravity, and therefore
we shall call it gravity from now on. For the cause of the centripetal force by
which the moon is kept in its orbit ought to be extended to all the planets, by
rules 1, 2, and 4.” Rules 1 and 2 tell us not to postulate more causes than are
sufficient for the effect (P5) and that we should assume that effects of the same
kind have causes of the same kind (P3). Rule 4 tells us that (a) we ought to
regard proposition 5 as “either exactly or very nearly true,” (b) new observa-
tional evidence may make proposition 5 “either more exact or liable to excep-
tions,” and (c) proposition 5 may not be refuted by “contrary hypotheses.” I
noted above that rule 4 seems to invite us to regard propositions as highly
probable until other evidence either increases or decreases our credence in
the proposition.
I now suggest an alternative reading of this rule, addressing the three
parts of rule 4 in turn.
2.2.1. We Ought to Regard Proposition 5 as “Either Exactly or Very Nearly
True.” This tells us what epistemic attitude we should take toward propo-
sitions. The phrase “either exactly or very nearly true” is usually interpreted
as ‘highly probable’. However, I now argue for an alternative reading of this
passage. In the original Latin, the relevant phrase in rule 4 appears as “pro
veris aut accurate aut quamproxime haberi debent” (Newton 1726/1972,
555). In Latin, quamproxime literally means ‘closest (proxime) in the high-
est possible degree (quam)’. In their translation of the Principia (Newton
1726/1999), Cohen and Whitman translate the phrase as ‘very nearly’. In-
deed, out of context, this seems to be a reasonable translation. However,
many commentators agree that this does not capture the strength and signif-
icance of the phrase when used by Newton. For example, Ducheyne (2012,
82 n. 151, 118 n. 51) has made a strong case for the translation “as most
closely as possible,” whereas Smith (e.g., 2002) prefers to treat quampro-
xime as a technical term.88. On the role of ‘quamproxime propositions’ in the Principia, see Smith (2002, 155–
56) and Ducheyne (2012, 82–92).
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 871So what does quamproxime mean in this context? Newton approached
universal gravitation via a series of increasingly complex model systems.
In book 1 of the Principia, he modeled the laws of motion in a one-body sys-
tem, establishing that a body would display perfect Keplerian motion when
acted on by an inverse square centripetal force. This is because, in a one-
body system, there is no mutual attraction. But, once he added a second body,
he found that, if a body displays Keplerian motion quamproxime, then it is
maintained by a centripetal force directed quamproxime towards a central
body (Newton 1726/1999, 448). That is, the consequent holds quamproxime
as long as the antecedent holds quamproxime.Quamproxime captures the de-
gree to which orbits are perturbed by other bodies in the system.
In short, this phrase tells us that we should take this proposition as true,
which is to say it captures the essential dynamics of the system.
2.2.2. New Observational Evidence May Make Proposition 5 “Either More
Exact or Liable to Exceptions.” This tells us what to do in the face of new
evidence. The probabilist reading says that new evidence either increases or
decreases our credence in the proposition. I prefer a different interpretation:
if exceptions to proposition 5 occur, instead of reducing our credence in the
proposition, we should add detail (thus, making it more accurate) or degen-
eralize the proposition (thus, restricting the domain to which it applies). De-
generalizing a proposition does not reduce certainty; rather, it reduces the prop-
osition’s scope while maintaining certainty.
Newton expressed this idea much more clearly in draft material: “If a
proposition gathered by induction is not sufficiently accurate, then it should
be corrected, not by introducing (ad hoc) hypotheses, but by more widely
and accurately observed phenomena of nature. If this turns out impossible,
however, then the proposition should be de-generalized” (Ducheyne 2012,
119).9 Thus, if faced with ‘contrary instances’, we should reduce the domain
to which the proposition applies: it is true, but true of fewer instances.
2.2.3. Proposition 5 May Not Be Refuted by “Contrary Hypotheses.” This
claim instructs us in the treatment of ‘contrary hypotheses’. A theory’s un-
certainty could be sourced in countervailing evidence or competing theo-
ries. That proposition 5 may not be refuted by ‘contrary hypotheses’ is often
interpreted as denying that competing theories can change our credence in
the present theory. Take Achinstein’s (2013, 74–75) reading, for example:
“There may be another hypothesis, incompatible with yours, from which
the same phenomena can be derived and explained. If so, then, according9. Ducheyne’s translation and paraphrasing of draft material relating to the Principia,
2nd ed.
This content downloaded from 144.173.177.063 on March 22, 2019 02:41:39 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
872 KIRSTEN WALSH
All uto the hypothetico-deductivist, that hypothesis would also be established.
But two incompatible hypotheses can’t both be established on the basis
of the same phenomena. From the ‘mere possibility’ of a hypothesis—that
is, from the mere fact that it entails and explains a range of phenomena—
you cannot conclude that it is true.” Similarly, Harper (2011, 109) takes
contrary hypotheses as alternative propositions that are not “sufficiently
supported empirically to be counted as serious rivals.” Such interpretations,
we shall see, miss the point. Newton tells us that hypotheses must not influ-
ence our epistemic attitude toward the theory (i.e., proposition 5). That is,
according to rule 4, only phenomena (i.e., observed motions of celestial
bodies) can influence the universality of proposition 5.
My interpretation of this claim turns on Newton’s (unique) distinction be-
tween ‘theories’ and ‘hypotheses’. Although well established among New-
ton scholars, the distinction is not well understood, so it is worth covering
here.
In Newton’s methodology, theories and hypotheses deal with different
subject matter, have different epistemic statuses, and perform different roles.
Theories systematize the observable, measurable properties of things; hy-
potheses describe the (unobservable) nature of things. Theories are inferred
from observation and experiment; hypotheses are speculative. For example,
Newton saw universal gravitation as a theory, since it was inferred from ce-
lestial and terrestrial observations, and systematised those observations. How-
ever, an explanation of the nature and cause of gravity would be a hypothesis,
since it concerns the unobservable, and is speculative rather than inferred from
experiment. The distinction is nicely captured in a draft letter fromNewton to
Roger Cotes (March 1713): “One may suppose that bodies may by an un-
known power be perpetually accelerated and so reject the first law of motion.
One may suppose that God can create a penetrable body and so reject the im-
penetrability of matter. But to admit of such hypotheses in opposition to ra-
tional propositions founded upon phenomena by induction is to destroy all
arguments taken from phenomena by induction and all principles founded
upon such arguments” (Newton 2004, 120).
Recall that rule 4 tells us that hypotheses may not refute or alter “proposi-
tions gathered from phenomena,” namely, theories. For Newton, theories were
on epistemically surer footing than hypotheses because they were grounded in
phenomena, whereas hypotheses were grounded in speculation. When faced
with disagreement between hypotheses and theories, we should modify the
hypothesis to fit the theory, not vice versa. Newton (2004, 120) explained this
idea in the same letter to Cotes: “And therefore as I regard not hypotheses in
explaining the phenomena of nature, so I regard them not in opposition to ar-
guments founded upon phenomena by induction or to principles settled upon
such arguments. In arguing for any principle or proposition from phenomenaThis content downloaded from 144.173.177.063 on March 22, 2019 02:41:39 AM
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 873by induction, hypotheses are not to be considered. The argument holds good
till some phenomenon can be produced against it.”10 So, according to rule 4:
1. In the absence of exceptions, we should take gravity to be universal.
2. If exceptions to universal gravitation are found, we should infer that
the domain of the theory of gravitation is limited (i.e., not universal).
3. We should not allow our imagined possibilities (e.g., the possibility of
a penetrable body) or assumptions about natural mechanisms (e.g., the
implausibility of action at a distance) to have any influence on our ep-
istemic attitude toward universal gravitation.
Rule 4, then, should not be read probabilistically. Newton uses it to claim
that the theory of universal gravitation is certain, that exceptions should
lead us to restrict the domain of the theory, and that ideas about the nature
of gravitation, that is, hypotheses about it, should play no epistemic role.
Let us apply this kind of thinking to query 23/31.
2.3. Revisiting Query 23/31. Recall P:10. T
pothe
All If no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be pro-
nounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur
from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Excep-
tions as occur. (Newton 1730/1952, 404)This passage is similar to part of rule 4 of the Principia: new observational
evidence may make a theory “either more exact or liable to exceptions”
(Newton 1726/1999, 796). From its application in the argument for univer-
sal gravitation (proposition 5), we have seen that rule 4 tells us, in the face
of refutation, to update a theory’s scope, not its epistemic warrant. Gener-
alizations may be degeneralized, but degeneralization does not reduce cre-
dence. That is, it does not take us from certainty to probability. P should be
read in the same way. Newton does not suggest that we lower our credence
in the face of countervailing evidence; rather, we should maintain certainty
but decrease scope.
3. June 1672 and Newton’s Early Optical Work. In this section, I assess
Shapiro’s claim that Newton’s response to Robert Hooke (June 1672) rep-
resents the first stage in a gradual shift in Newton’s thinking about certainty.
First, I will get clearer on Shapiro’s claim by contrasting Newton’s Februaryhis is the idea Newton (1726/1972, 584) expressed with his (in)famous phrase hy-
ses non fingo.
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All u1672 statement with his response to Hooke in June 1672. We will see that,
in June 1672, Newton’s claims about certainty are apparently more moder-
ate than the statement from February 1672. This lends prima facie support
to Shapiro’s position. However, I will challenge Shapiro’s position with a
methodological passage from Newton’s Optical Lectures, completed in 1670.
In this passage, Newton offers a moderate view, similar to the view he ex-
pressed in June 1672. This suggests that June 1672 does not mark a shift in
Newton’s thinking about certainty. Rather, Newton’s notion of certainty
was always somewhat moderate—but never probabilistic. I will close by ar-
guing that Newton’s moderate ‘certainty’ is compelled assent.
3.1. June 1672 and Newton’s Response to Hooke. Let us consider
Newton’s (1959–77, 1:96–97) scandalous statement from February 1672:
“A naturalist would scearce expect to see ye science of [colors] become
mathematicall, & yet I dare affirm that there is as much certainty in it as
in any other part of Opticks. For what I shall tell concerning them is not
an hypothesis but most rigid consequence, not conjectured by barely infer-
ring ‘tis thus because not otherwise or because it satisfies all Phænomena
(the Philosophers universall Topick,) but evinced by ye mediation of exper-
iments concluding directly & without any suspicion of doubt.” These are
surprising ideas. While the Royal Society valued epistemic responsibility
(see, e.g., Locke 1690/1997 andHooke 1665/1966, preface), Newton claimed
certainty (apparently) without warrant. Indeed, the passage was omitted from
the published version (see Newton 1672, 3077; 1959–77, 1:96–97). Hooke
was one of the few of Newton’s contemporaries who read the passage; and
it jarred. He objected that Newton was not justified in claiming that his theory
was mathematically certain.
Newton (1959–77, 1:187) responded that he had never claimed mathe-
matical certainty: “I should take notice of a casuall expression wch intimates
a greater certainty in these things then I ever promised, viz. The certainty of
Mathematical Demonstrations.” He contrasted ‘mathematical certainty’ with
the certainty offered by the ‘mathematical sciences’. While the former is
achieved by reasoning to mathematical theorems from mathematical princi-
ples, the latter starts with physical principles and reasons mathematically to
physical propositions. Newton claimed to have achieved this latter certainty:
“Now the evidence by wch I asserted the Propositions of colours is in the
next words expressed to be from Experiments & so but Physicall: Whence
the Propositions themselves can be esteemed no more then Physicall Prin-
ciples of a Science” (1:187). And from such physical principles, reasoning
mathematically, Newton had derived a theory of color. Therefore, his sci-
ence of colors was “Mathematicall & as certain as any part of Optiques”
(1:188).This content downloaded from 144.173.177.063 on March 22, 2019 02:41:39 AM
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 875In this explanation, Newton suggests a more moderate certainty—point-
ing out that the certainty possible in optics is limited. He explained that the
science of colors, “Optiques & many other Mathematicall Sciences depend
as well on Physicall Principles as on Mathematicall Demonstrations: And
the absolute certainty of a Science cannot exceed the certainty of its Prin-
ciples” (Newton 1959–77, 1:187). So, according to Newton, certainty in
optics is limited by (at least) two things. First, a proposition’s certainty is
constrained by the certainty of its principles. Second, optical principles are
experimental and hence not mathematically certain. It is easy to see why Sha-
piro interprets this as a subtle shift toward probabilism. In February 1672
Newton emphasized the mathematism and certainty of his theory, but in June
1672, he emphasized the lack of mathematical certainty and the experimental
basis of the theory. In the following section, however, I argue that no such
shift occurred.
3.2. Optical Lectures and Newton’s Mathematico-Experimental Method.
Newton’s approach was based on the idea that mathematics is a bearer of
certainty—one can reason deductively from certain axioms to theorems,
without losing certainty. Moreover, this method of reasoning is applicable
to natural philosophy: one can reason deductively from laws and principles
to propositions in natural philosophy, without epistemic loss. So, if one can
establish certain natural philosophical laws or principles, it is possible to
reason mathematically to certain propositions. Furthermore, Newton thought
it was possible to establish a certain principle via a single experiment.11
Newton first indicated such a method in his Optical Lectures, which
were completed by 1670.12 He argued that natural philosophy should com-
bine the insights of experimental philosophy and geometry—experimental
techniques can rigorously investigate nature, while mathematical techniques
enable reasoning to sound conclusions. In this way, we achieve an exact sci-
ence (accurata scientia [Newton 1984, 86, 438])—a science that yields per-
fectly accurate knowledge of the world. The passage is worth quoting in ex-
tenso:11. In
enced
12. N
trans
All Thus although colours may belong to physics, the science of them must
nevertheless be considered mathematical, insofar as they are treated by
mathematical reasoning. Indeed, since an exact science of them seems to
be one of the most difficult that philosophy is in need of, I hope to show—this mathematico-experimental methodology, Newton was almost certainly influ-
by Isaac Barrow (Shapiro 1993; Guicciardini 2011; Dunlop 2012).
ewton lodged two different versions with the Cambridge University Library. For
criptions and translations, see Newton (1984).
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All use subas it were, by my example—how valuable mathematics is in natural philos-
ophy. I therefore urge geometers to investigate nature more rigorously, and
those devoted to natural science to learn geometry first. Hence the former
shall not entirely spend their time in speculations of no value to human life,
nor shall the latter, while working assiduously with an absurdmethod, fail to
reach their goal. But truly with the help of philosophical geometers and geo-
metrical philosophers, instead of the conjectures and probabilities that are be-
ing blazoned about everywhere, we shall finally achieve a natural science
supported by the greatest evidence. (Newton 1984, 87–89, 439)In this passage, Newton contrasted the product of his mathematico-
experimental method, “a natural science supported by the greatest evidence,”
with the “conjectures and probabilities” produced by less rigorous investiga-
tion and reasoning. Here, Newton explicitly presents his methodology in op-
position to those who, “working assiduously with an absurd method,” reach
only probabilities rather than certainties. The passage shows us that what
Newton had in mind, even in 1670, was a science of optics, grounded in ex-
periment and observation, andmathematical only “insofar as [colors] are treated
by mathematical reasoning.” He did not claim to have achieved mathemat-
ical certainty but only the kind of certainty that could be achieved in natural
philosophy from careful experiments and mathematical reasoning—just as
in June 1672.4. Closing Remarks: Certainty as ‘Compelled Assent’. And so, Newton
did not become a probabilist—he remained committed to the view that his
methods produced certainty. But he did not mean mathematical certainty.
What, then, is Newtonian certainty?
I close with a brief suggestion: Newton’s certainty can be characterized
as ‘compelled assent’.13 When Newton claimed certainty, it was because he
thought the evidence compelled him undeniably to his conclusion. For ex-
ample, in his first paper (February 1672), Newton (1959–77, 1:95) wrote,
“And so the true cause . . . was detected to be no other then that Light con-
sists of Rays differently refrangible” (emphasis added to “detected to be no
other”). And to Hooke (June 1672), he wrote, “And that this whitenesse is
produced onely by a successive intermixture of the colours without their be-
ing assimilated or reduced to any uniformity, is certainly beyond all possi-
bility of doubting” (1:182–83; emphasis added). There was a social aspect
to this as well: Newton expected that others would draw the same conclu-
sion in the same context. For example, in his correspondence with the nat-develop this suggestion in Walsh (2017). The phrase ‘compelled assent’, which I
used on a few occasions in this essay, comes from Barbara Shapiro (1983, 29).
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NEWTON: FROM CERTAINTY TO PROBABILITY? 877ural philosopher Anthony Lucas (August 1676), Newton (1959–77, 2:79–
80) wrote as follows: “[Let Lucas examine the experiments given.] For if
any of those be demonstrative, they will need no assistants nor leave room
for further disputing about what they demonstrate. The main thing he goes
about to examin is ye different refrangibility of light. And this I demon-
strated by ye Experimentum Crucis. Now if this demonstration be good,
there needs no further examination of ye thing; if not good ye fault of it
is to be shewn, for ye only way to examin a demonstrated proposition is
to examin ye demonstration.” So, as far as Newton was concerned, the ex-
perimentum crucis did not provide ‘mere’ empirical support; it proved that
the “true cause” could be “no other” than the one he had identified (1:95).
And others, having carried out the same experiment, should be compelled
to accept the same conclusion.
This social aspect of Newton’s epistemology can be found in the Prin-
cipia. For example, in the scholium to the laws, he writes, “The principles
I have set forth are accepted by mathematicians and confirmed by experi-
ments of many kinds” (Newton 1726/1999, 424). And in his manuscript
De gravitatione, Newton (2004, 12) writes, “I have undertaken to demon-
strate its [i.e., the science of fluid dynamics] individual propositions from
abstract principles, sufficiently well known to the student, strictly and geo-
metrically.”And a few lines later: “The foundations from which this science
may be demonstrated are either definitions of certain words, or axioms and
postulates no one denies” (12). In these passages, Newton tells us that the
abstract principles of this science are supposed to be “sufficiently well
known to the student” or “definitions of certain words, or axioms and pos-
tulates no one denies.” The emphasis on students implies undisputed and
fundamental principles—what a student learns by way of introduction to
the field. Newton (1730/1952, 20) expressed a similar notion in his Opticks
while introducing the axioms: “For what hath been generally agreed on I
content my self to assume under the notion of Principles, in order to what
I have farther to write. And this may suffice for an Introduction to Readers
of quick Wit and good Understanding not yet versed in Opticks.” There are,
then, three components to ‘compelled assent’: for Newton, some proposi-
tion is certain when given (1) the evidence cited, someone of (2) sufficient
rationality (‘quick wit’) and (3) background knowledge (‘good understand-
ing’) would be forced to accept the truth of that proposition.
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